In defense of metaphysics

To be fair and square, let it be clarified that foremost, the title and the content may be seen to embody certain contradictions. First, this is not really to defend metaphysics. (At least, knowing that things don’t match up would make some sense on the one reading this.) And secondly, I might be talking non-sense after all so I deem it not necessary to find a more appropriate title.
It might have been true that the things that we can only speak about are those saying something about the sensible world. It will be much acceptable, since I will be speaking about the thoughts of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, not to betray his most profound assertions in the text. It then follows that everything written here may also be non-sensical and should also be considered as a ladder, maybe not for the clarification of language and understanding the world but a ladder to express what I have learned from Wittgenstein.
People especially us who are claiming fondness of philosophy tend to say that Wittgenstein, in claiming that he has solved all the problems of philosophy has projected an enormous philosophical arrogance. I stand half on the contrary. It may be true on one hand but false on another.
It has been the common pitfall of people before Wittgenstein to speak about the unutterable: same pitfall which he has employed in order to present to us what really matters in philosophizing, the clarification of language. His arrogance may have headed to a basic utterance of humility on behalf of the entire history of philosophy. The difference is the fact that he is aware that he, through the things he has written, is indeed talking non-sense. Others are proud enough not to claim that. It may be liken to a slap on the face but it is the best of several initiatives to aground philosophy on the threshold of reality, something that most of us have forgotten because of our desire to talk about something that will keep the heads of others spinning out of our mumbling of alienated words until their noses are bleeding to hell.
It is wrong to assume that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is demarcating the mystical. It is just that he just wants to justify the inevitable role of language in mirroring reality, something that most of us forgets not just in the philosophical arena but in our ordinary lives as well. It is just that we cannot actually talk about something transcendental. It is not to forfeit the fact that there are things that are transcendental. (And I think, they are not really things. I mean, you cannot see them hanging around.)
On the first place, it will betray its being transcendental. Secondly, every proposition made about it will ardently be lacking. And in just giving this couple of contradictions, I have violated it’s being transcendental.
It has not always been the case that when one is talking about superficial things, he may be said to be the holder of knowledge. (I just wonder if I can say to some priests that most of the time they are talking non-sense.) Anyway, language itself together with logic is transcendental. Hence, according to Wittgenstein, Language is not capable of explaining why it can picture reality.
At first glance, it may seem that the awkward nature of Wittgenstein’s assertion is the unparalleled recognition of the microcosm in an attempt to ascertain a universal understanding of particular terms. But these, should also be seen in relation to language. “The limit of my language is the limit of my world”(5.6).
The Wittgenstein project seems to target the universality of meaning through propositions mirroring actual state-of-affairs but what is good about it is it doesn’t neglect the importance of the individual. “I am my world” (5.631) AS Wittgenstein will put it. Our visual field determines the limit of what we can actually know.
We may look at Wittgenstein likening him to a flat iron used to set straight the crumpled cloth of philosophy. It was my honest mistake to look at him before like an antagonist killing the thrill of philosophizing. Maybe, I failed to understand him on my first reading. It may be because I myself have that philosophical arrogance that I have looked at him before as someone who crumples down the sacred nature of philosophy. Lately have I realized that, in a way, he is actually building it from the crumbs.
At the end of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein wrote “What we cannot speak of, we must pass over in silence.” My arrogance before taught me to look at as if he just ran out of words to say. It is only this past few days that I realized that it may have been possible that Wittgenstein wants to say a lot of things about the unspeakable but silence is the best way to make everything complete.